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The role of firm capital structure in alliance formation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What role does a firm’s financial health play in its alliancing activity? In the strategy literature, 
theoretical explanations of alliances (e.g. Teece, 1986) have typically highlighted their efficacy in 
enabling firms to acquire and access resources residing in other firms. Following these perspectives, key 
alliance decisions such as firm partnering choices (i.e., whom to partner with) and alliance governance 
(e.g. equity versus non equity) have usually been explained from the perspective of the resources and 
capabilities being combined by parent firms in the alliance, with the objective assumed to be to preserve 
and maximize the value of these resources over the course of the cooperation. In this paper, we develop a 
complementary perspective and argue that apart from these resources and capabilities, a firm’s financial 
policies (i.e., its capital structure) also have an important bearing on various aspects of its alliancing 
activity. Empirically, we demonstrate that a firm’s leverage has a systematic impact on the types of 
alliance partners it attracts as well as the choice of alliance governance. Moreover, we also show that the 
imperative to be perceived as an attractive alliance partner in the market for inter-firm collaboration can 
induce some firms to maintain lower leverage in their capital structures.  
Our hypotheses are based on two central arguments. First, we propose that the role of financial 
policies in alliancing activity is important because of a critical ex post hazard in alliances: the risk of 
unplanned termination. Unplanned termination occurs when one partner unilaterally withdraws from the 
relationship before its objectives have been achieved (Sadowski and Duysters 2008, Reuer and Arino 
2002, Reuer and Zollo 2005). The costs associated with such unanticipated termination can be substantial 
because the efforts devoted to the alliance and the resources developed within it (such as joint 
 technologies or marketing knowhow) are often sunk and cannot be fully recovered if the relationship is 
prematurely terminated. Moreover, such events can also be particularly frustrating because neither firm 
may wish to terminate the alliance, but one firm may simply be unable to continue to contribute effort to 
the alliance, thereby prevent strategic goals from being achieved.  
Prior evidence points to a strong link between firm financial health and unplanned termination in 
alliances. Reports from the popular press indicate that firms often withdraw from an alliance and sell their 
stakes to their partners or to external firms to raise cash and pay down debta.  In a recent paper 
documenting the effects of bankruptcy of an alliance partner, Boone and Ivanov (2012) find that firms 
experience a significant negative stock price reaction when an alliance partner files for bankruptcyb. In 
addition they also find that the non-bankrupt alliance partners experienced a significant drop in 
profitability and investment levels in the subsequent two years. Taken together, the evidence suggests that 
financial constraints are an important cause of alliance termination and have potentially detrimental 
performance consequences.  
 Building on this perspective, our second argument is that leverage is an important determinant of 
partner attractiveness in numerous transactions, including alliances. The relationship between partner 
attractiveness and leverage has been previously highlighted by stakeholder theories of debt and capital 
structure. These theories were developed in response to Miller and Modigliani’s (1958) work, which 
suggests that in the presence of corporate tax savings, firms should maximize debt in their capital 
structure while minimizing equity. To explain the limits on debt, stakeholder perspectives argue that as 
leverage increases, employees, customers and suppliers impose various costs on the firm (e.g. demanding 
higher compensation or paying lower prices) due to the increased probability of bankruptcy and financial 
distress (Cornell and Shapiro 1987). These costs ultimately induce firms to limit the amount of debt in 
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a For example, in 1997 Eli Lilly sold its 40% stake in its JV with Dow Chemical, named Dow Elanco, and used the 
proceeds of USD 900 million to pay down debt from a recent acquisition. Similarly, General Mills sold its stake in 
its European JV with Pepsico for USD 750 million as part of its debt reduction efforts. 
b As an example, in 2005 the shares of brake manufacturer Pacifica fell by nearly 10 percent when its customer and 
joint venture partner, Delphi, filed for bankruptcy. A key part of Pacifica’s operations was a plant that it operated 
jointly with Delphi to supply brakes to GM. 
 their capital structure. Thus, higher leverage makes a firm a less attractive transaction partner (Titman 
1984) and creates disincentives for stakeholders to make relationship specific investments. Our study 
extends this reasoning to the context of alliances and argues that leverage similarly makes a firm an 
unattractive alliance partner since it increases the risk of unplanned termination.  
Based on our central arguments that financial health and the implied risk of unplanned 
termination influence a firm’s attractiveness as an alliance partner, we develop and test several 
hypotheses. First, we demonstrate that firms tend to form alliances with partners characterized by 
relatively similar levels of leverage. This double sided matching of leverage occurs in the market for 
collaboration because low leverage firms prefer other low leverage firms as partners, whereas high 
leverage firms are constrained to partner with other high leverage firms due to the risks of unanticipated 
termination. Our analyses confirm that firm leverage and partner leverage are positively associated. 
Moreover, we also hypothesize and find that a firm’s leverage is negatively associated with its partners 
Tobin’s Q, suggesting that levered firms are also constrained to partner with lower quality firms.   
The second important result we obtain is that we also demonstrate that the propensity to use 
equity-based agreements in alliances increases both as a firms leverage increases and as the difference in 
leverage across the alliance partners increases. Prior literature extensively argues that equity is effective 
in aligning incentives and in containing appropriability hazards in an alliance relationship. We 
complement these studies and show that equity is also important because it provides an enforceable 
mechanism and a safeguard through which specific investments can be salvaged by a lower levered 
partner in the event of premature termination by a more leveraged firm (Pisano, 1989). Finally, we posit 
that a value maximizing firm interested in forming alliances would anticipate the costs of leverage and ex 
ante limit debt in its capital structure. Accordingly, we demonstrate that after controlling for potential 
endogeneity, a firm’s leverage is negatively related to the number of alliances it forms. This result 
suggests alliance intensive firms maintain lower leverage in their capital structure, presumably to induce 
other firms to enter into partnerships with them and make relationship specific investments. 
 Our research makes three important contributions to the literature. First, we highlight that 
financial constraints and capital structure have significant implications for alliancing activity. While it 
stands to reason that when entering into an alliance, partners will gauge each others attractiveness not just 
in terms of the resources they possess but also in terms of their ability to sustain the venture in financial 
terms, this intuition has neither been formalized nor its implications fully explored. We seek to fill this 
gap. Second, and relatedly, we show that financial constraints and leverage provide us with an enhanced 
understanding of how firms select their alliance partners and the form of governance they choose. Third, 
in the spirit of this special volume, our study also highlights a unique link between corporate strategy and 
corporate finance. While there has been a vast literature on the determinants of capital structure, this 
literature has so far not recognized the role of alliances in determining leverage.  Our study adds to this 
stream and suggests that the desire to be perceived as an attractive strategic alliance partner is another 
potentially important factor that can cause firms to maintain a lower leverage in their capital structure. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
As noted at the outset, the literature on partner selection is vast and multi dimensional and has 
highlighted several factors. Central to these various streams is the theme that firms enter into alliances 
based on the resources and capabilities of the partner. While access to partner complementary resources 
may be a critical driver of alliance formation, the value of the collaboration might never be realized if 
financial distress by one partner disrupts the continuity of the alliance and undermines a partner’s ability 
to devote consistent efforts. Thus, resource considerations should be traded off against the risk implied by 
partner financial health. Below, we develop this intuition further by integrating the alliance literature with 
insights from stakeholder theories of capital structure. 
Stakeholder theories of capital structure have argued and shown that firm leverage can potentially 
impose costs on stakeholders such as employees, customers buying long-lived assets, dependent 
suppliers, or any other stakeholders exchanging unique products and services with the firm (Titman 1984, 
Kale and Sharur 2007, Banerjee et al. 2008). In particular, unique products and services often involve 
 investments that are relation-specific, whose value is maximized only as long as the two parties transact 
with each other (Williamson 1985). If the relationship is terminated due to financial distress or 
bankruptcy, these investments lose value. Thus, as higher leverage implies a greater risk of bankruptcy 
and financial distress, external stakeholders are often reluctant to invest in relation specific assets with 
highly levered firms unless they are compensated, ex ante, by better terms. 
Investments involved in alliances with highly levered firms expose partners to similar costs and 
risks. Firms chose alliances when the interactions with a particular transacting partner are repeated and 
intense (Teece 1986). Such interactions call for close formal and informal coordination mechanisms that 
enable the flow of information, and are greatly facilitated by an alliance structure as opposed to by arms 
length transactions (Agarwal, Croson, and Mahoney 2010). While such interactions and coordination 
mechanisms facilitate innovation, they also inevitably build relationship specific assets such as shared 
knowledge or technologies. If one partner prematurely terminates the venture due to reasons such as 
financial distress, the value of the resources or shared knowledge is significantly diminished (Boone and 
Ivanov, 2012). Thus, despite its best intentions, a highly levered partner inevitably puts at risk the 
continuity of an alliance and the value of the investments undertaken by both sides because its weak 
financial position may result in unplanned termination. 
In addition to loss of relationship specific assets, high leverage can also give rise to additional 
costs even when there is no immediate risk of bankruptcy because leverage influences a firms incentives 
to meet implicit commitments to stakeholders. Implicit commitments are too state-contingent to be 
reduced to a written form, and thus during periods of cash shortfalls a levered firm may have incentives to 
default on those claims in order to shore up its financial health (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). 
Consequently, scholars have demonstrated that highly levered firms are more likely to provide their 
customers lower quality inputs and skimp on follow-up services for existing products (Cornell and 
 Shapiro 1987, Maksimovic and Titman 1991).c In the context of alliances, one important implicit claim is 
the commitment to provide high quality effort over the duration of the alliance. During financially tough 
times levered firms may reduce critical resource contributions to the alliance, such as cash flows and 
managerial resources and personnel (Inkpen, 2000; Khanna et al. 1998). Under these circumstances, the 
alliance partner is either faced with the prospect of terminating the alliance and losing its relationship 
specific assets or continuing the alliance despite the half-hearted efforts of the levered partner. This 
problem could be partially mitigated if effort levels could be contractually specified ex-ante, but such 
terms are difficult to write given the contingencies involved. Consequently, a leveraged firms 
commitment to provide high quality effort over the duration of the alliance remains an unenforceable 
implicit claim, which is a critical factor from the perspective of the partner in the alliance (although, as we 
note below, equity alliances may mitigate these concerns). 
In addition to reduced effort, a lower levered firm is exposed to another form of ex post 
opportunism when partnering with a levered counterpart. A firm experiencing financial distress could try 
to extract concessions from a more financially healthy partner by threatening termination of the alliance 
and requesting either financial support or renegotiation for more favorable terms. Thus, a lower levered 
firm may once again be faced with the choice between terminating the alliance and losing the value of its 
relation-specific investments or perpetuating the alliance despite ex post opportunistic behavior (Reuer 
and Arino 2002, Arino et al. 2008) by subsidizing the levered partner in some mannerd. 
It is important to note that while our first argument is that high leverage may cause unplanned 
termination despite partner best intentions, our last two arguments make the point that highly levered 
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c!The short-term gains from such tactics would immediately benefit a firm’s shareholders. On the other hand, if 
customers later detect opportunistic behavior and react by punishing the firm, the debt holders would bear most of 
the costs as they bear most of the downside risks of the firm. 
!
d!For example, in 2009 the financially constrained De Beers asked its joint venture partner, Mountain 
Province Diamond, for a renegotiation of their existing agreement. The new terms were less financially 
onerous for De Beers and required Mountain Province to reimburse De Beers a significant portion of 
historic sunk costs in exchange for increased control rights in the venture. Similarly, in October 2001, 
Telstra rescued its debt-laden joint venture partner Austar by providing additional funding for the venture, 
causing shares in Austar to soar 69 percent.!
 firms could also extract gains by being opportunistic. Alternatively, it could be argued that since highly 
levered firms are likely to face financial constraints, they may need to form more alliances in order to 
extricate themselves from their financial troubles. These pressures could make the desperate firm more 
(and not less) amenable to making the alliance work and thus be less opportunistic. However, as soon as 
concerns about financial distress arise and firm survival is put at threat, any such inter-firm commitments 
are rapidly undermined by the potential of extracting wealth from alliance partners. Hence, the overall 
effect of higher leverage is to increase risks related to partner commitment towards the alliance. 
In summary, while alliances help firms access complementary partner resources, they also 
inevitably involve the presence of relationship specific assets, which raise the costs of premature 
termination. Partnering with highly leveraged firms not only increases the risk of premature termination, 
but also exposes the unlevered firm to various forms of ex post opportunism such as a lack of effort or 
bargaining for financial support and more favorable terms. Thus, even though a levered firm might be a 
source of valuable synergies, the potential value that can be obtained by combining complementary assets 
must be weighted against the risks posed by partner financial condition. Rational firms should anticipate 
these risks and take ex ante action by carefully selecting potential partners based on their leverage. This 
implies that, ceteris paribus, low leverage firms are generally more attractive partners and should have 
greater opportunities to find collaborators. At the same time, they are also likely to face additional 
opportunism when dealing with highly levered counterparts, and hence they would tend to avoid 
partnering with such firms. Conversely, highly levered firms will generally be constrained to partner with 
other highly levered firms because these firms are generally unable to attract low leveraged firms. Thus, 
we predict the following: 
H1. Firms will tend to form alliances with partners characterized by similar levels of leverage. 
 
The influence of a firm’s leverage on the risk of unplanned termination will also likely impact the 
quality of the alliance partners that a firm can attract. One of the primary reasons for engaging in alliances 
is to combine complementary assets and stimulate innovation. Firms possessing high quality resources are 
 the most valuable partners because they should be able to generate the most valuable synergies. 
Consequently, high quality firms have more bargaining power in the market for collaboration, which they 
can use in order to partner with the most desirable associates (Rodhes, Kropf and Robinson 2008). We 
contend that, due to their superior resources endowments, high quality firms will have the bargaining 
power to avoid the risks entailed by partnering with highly levered firms. Indeed, during cash flow 
fluctuations, the lack of incentives to devote consistent efforts by a highly leveraged firm could 
undermine the realization of synergies. Furthermore despite best intentions to devote effort, synergies 
would also not be realized if the alliance terminates prematurely because of a partner’s financial 
difficulties. Thus, higher quality firms face a greater opportunity cost by partnering with highly leveraged 
counter-parts.  As a result, high quality firms will thus tend to select lower levered counterparts. 
H2. There is a negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and the quality of its partners. 
 
Thus far we have argued that highly leveraged firms are unattractive partners due to greater risks 
of financial distress and unplanned termination, which dissuades low levered and high quality firms from 
forming alliances with them. However, highly leveraged firms can ex ante offer various forms of 
protection and safeguards in order to attract desirable partners. One particular form of protection that is 
likely to be effective in this regard is structuring the alliance as an equity joint venture (JV). As Pisano 
(1989) observes, allocating equity in an alliance requires putting a value on the expected contributions of 
each firm prior to the commencement of the partnership. Typically it entails negotiations and explicitly 
drawing out agreements regarding such relative contributions. Once drawn out, these agreements can be 
legally enforced by the partner (Ryall and Sampson, 2009), which may prevent any subsequent reneging 
or scaling back of effort on the part of a levered firm. Moreover, any shirking by the leveraged firm 
reduces the value of the JV and the value of its equity position, which would lower the proceeds it could 
obtain should it attempt to raise funds by selling its stake in the JV to the partner or to a third party, which 
are common methods of JV termination (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Cuypers and Martin, 2007).  
 Equity participation and a JV structure also provide other advantages besides ensuring continuity 
of effort. Typically a JV has a board with members drawn from the constituent partners. Through such a 
structure, a partner can safeguard its investments by exercising better control and monitoring of the efforts 
of a highly leveraged firm on a more continuous basis. Moreover, such ongoing control also allows the 
partner to understand the joint ventures operations more intimately. In the event of an unplanned 
termination, the partner may be able to salvage its investments by taking over the venture entirely. The 
protection provided by equity and a JV structure is, however, also costly for both parties since it involves 
a greater commitment of resources from the outset (e.g., managerial resources in the form of human 
capital and employees specifically devoted to the alliance). For a highly leveraged firm, its willingness to 
devote such resources and human capital acts as a form of credible commitment to sustain the 
collaboration and devote consistent effort. Conversely, a JV structure should be desirable also from the 
counter-parts point of view (regardless of its leverage), since to the extent that there is value in 
collaborating with a leveraged partner, it may be willing to incur such costs upfront. Hence, we predict: 
H3. Alliances involving highly levered firms are more likely to be equity-based. 
 
As an extension of H3, we also posit that an alliance is more likely to take the form of a JV as the 
difference in leverage between the two partners grows. Although any alliance partner could potentially 
seek concessions or skimp on future resource commitments, the problem should be particularly acute 
when one firm is lowly levered and financially healthy while the other is highly levered. Under these 
conditions, the unlevered firm is particularly vulnerable to the threat that the levered firm may use its 
financially weak position as justification for renegotiation and extracting concessions. Consequently 
lower levered firms have greater incentives to require their highly levered counterparts to commit to the 
additional protections afforded by an equity JV. Conversely, the additional costs of a JV structure 
(described above) are less likely to be regarded as warranted when both firms are low leveraged due to the 
lower threat of opportunistic renegotiation and extracting concessions, given that both partners are 
financially healthy. Similarly, a JV is also less likely to occur when both firms are highly levered as the 
 weak financial positions of both partners reduce the risk of opportunism while making the additional costs 
of a JV difficult to afford. Hence, we argue the following: 
H4. The greater the difference between partners leverage, the greater the probability that an 
alliance will take the form of a JV. 
 
Thus far, our theory has focused on the alliance level of analysis by predicting patterns in partner 
selection and alliance governance. For our final hypothesis, we take a firm level perspective and argue 
that firms that make alliances a strategic priority will adopt lower leverage in order to improve their own 
attractiveness as an alliance partner. Stakeholder theories provide evidence that in conditions where 
customers and suppliers incur firm specific investments, firms maintain a lower level of leverage. In line 
with this reasoning, Titman and Wessels (1988) show that firms tend to have lower leverage when they 
operate in durable goods industries, where customers switching costs and relationship specific assets tend 
to be high. Banerjee et al. (2008) similarly show that firms with dedicated suppliers (i.e., suppliers for 
whom more than 10% of sales come from the firm) and dedicated customers (i.e., customers for whom 
the firm constitutes greater than 10% of sales) maintain lower leverage so that that they can induce these 
dedicated suppliers or customers to transact primarily with them and develop valuable firm specific 
assets. Similarly, Kale and Shahrur (2007) show that the R&D intensity of suppliers and customers is 
negatively associated with firm leverage, indicating that lower leverage stimulates these stakeholders to 
invest in technological resources that are likely to be relationship specific.  
If financial health matters to alliance partners like it does to customers and suppliers, we would 
expect to observe that firms actively seeking alliance partners would similarly adopt lower leverage in 
order to induce other firms to form partnerships and make specific investments. Furthermore, existing 
 influential alliance partners may also encourage the firm to keep leverage low ex post or even to reduce it 
further, if necessary in order to protect their relationship specific investments. Accordingly, we predict:e 
H5. A firm’s leverage will be negatively related to its alliance intensity. 
METHODS 
Data and sample 
We drew data on all alliances announced between the years 1988 and 2006 from the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) database on mergers, acquisitions, and alliances. We restricted our attention to 
two partner alliances to ease the comparison among partners’ characteristics. In addition, we also 
excluded from our sample alliances involving financial firms, since leverage has a different interpretation 
in those industries. For alliances meeting these criteria information was retrieved on the partners’ names, 
SIC codes, state of incorporation, descriptions of activities involved in the alliance, geographical 
locations, and other governance-related data such as the presence of equity-exchanges.  
Accounting and financial data on the partnering firms were gathered from Compustat. After 
combining all data, we were left with 4220 alliances involving 2074 distinct firms. On average, each of 
these 2074 focal firms is associated with 4.1 alliances in our final sample. Our final sample includes 
alliances in a wide variety of sectors. Adopting Fama and Frenchs twelve industry classification, the 
distributions of the alliance activity across industrial codes is as follows: computer, software and 
electronic equipment (48.1 percent); healthcare, medical equipment and drugs (8.45 percent); chemical 
and allied products (1.37 percent); manufacturing (2.84 percent); consumer durables (1.59 percent); 
telephone and television transmission (2.06 percent); wholesale, retail and related services (11 percent); 
and finance (8.65). All remaining industries account for minor percentages. 
Dependent variables 
In order to test hypothesis 1, which posits that firms with similar levels of leverage will partner 
with each other, we adopt two approaches. First, as we discuss in greater detail in the results section, we 
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e!This implies that a firm’s leverage and its alliance activity are jointly determined. Hence it is important 
to test the above argument by controlling for potential endogeneity, a point that we address in the 
Methods section.!
 compared differences in leverage among allied firms with the difference in leverage of random pairs of 
firms picked from the entire Compustat database. Second, and more formally, we tested the hypothesis by 
constructing a hierarchical linear regression model to regress partner leverage on alliance level variables 
and focal firm leverage. Since firms formed multiple alliances in our sample, we constructed our data set 
so that each alliance with its corresponding partner and alliance characteristics was nested within the firm. 
Thus, for the 2074 firms in our sample, a focal firms alliance appears as a nested observation within the 
partners observations, and correspondingly the same alliance appears as a nested observation within the 
focal firms observations. Accordingly, to test this relationship, we measured the partners market leverage 
(PLEV), where market leverage is computed as total debt divided by total market value of the firm, and 
the total market value of the firm is the sum of the book value of debt plus total market value of 
outstanding sharesf. We similarly constructed a measure of the partners Tobin’s Q to proxy for firm 
quality and test hypothesis 2, which posits that leveraged firms will attract lower quality partners. The 
variable PQ is computed as: (market value of equity + total assets - common equity) / (total assets). 
Our third and fourth hypotheses relate partners leverage to the choice of the governance form of 
the alliance. We used a hierarchical model for this analysis as well, and we constructed a dummy variable 
(JV) which takes the value of one when the alliance is a joint venture and zero otherwiseg. Finally, our last 
hypothesis relates a firm’s alliance intensity with its own level of leverage. In order to test this hypothesis, 
we took the entire population of firms in Compustat and structured our sample as a panel data. We then 
regressed firm leverage (LEV) in a given year on the number of alliances formed during that year and 
other firm level controls, where leverage is defined as the firms market leverage. 
Key Independent Variables 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
f!Results are qualitatively unchanged if we use the book value of total assets in the denominator.!
g!Following previous works on alliance governance, we exclude minority equity positions and define 
equity alliances as joint ventures only. However, our results are virtually unchanged when we also 
considered these arrangements as equity alliances. 
!
 The variables leverage (LEV) and partner leverage (PLEV) in the year of alliance formation were 
also used as independent variables to test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. To test hypothesis 4, which pertains to 
the impact of differences in partner leverage on the choice of governance, we also constructed the 
variable DELTA, which is the absolute difference in market leverage between the two partners. Finally, 
for hypothesis 5, which relates to the effects of alliance intensity on the focal firm leverage, we 
constructed the variable ALLIANCES as a count of all alliances formed by the focal firm in a given year. 
Models 
Hypothesis 1 suggests a double sided matching in the market for collaboration, whereby a highly 
levered firm is more likely to form alliances with other highly levered firms, while a lower levered firm is 
more likely to ally with other conservatively financed partners. To test this prediction, the following 
equation is estimated: 
   (1) !"#$!" = !!! + !!! + !!!"#$!" + !!!"!" + !!!"#!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!!"#!" + !!!"#!" +!!!!" + !!!"!" + !!!"##$%!" + !!" 
 
As groups of alliances formed by the same focal firm are likely to possess common characteristics, 
and observations related to the same focal firm are likely to be correlated, we employed hierarchical 
models wherein alliances are nested within firms. Accordingly in (1) the variables denoted by P are 
partner characteristics and are at the alliance level, which are modeled as nested within the firm, Hence, 
for alliance j formed by focal firm i a random intercept term is included in order to capture these 
dependencies. Similarly, hypothesis 2 examines the impact of leverage on the quality of alliance partners 
a focal firm is able to attract. To test this hypothesis, we tested the following hierarchical model where, as 
before, alliances are nested within firms: 
(2)!"!" = !!! + !!! + !!!"#!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#$!" + +!!!"#$!" + !!!"!" + !!!!"##$%!" +!!!"#!" + !!!!" + !!!"#!" + !!!"     
 
 For both models above, we included several control variables that could impact either a firms 
leverage or the quality of the alliance partners it attracts. ROA and PROA are the focal and partner firms 
return on assets, respectively, where return on assets is defined as operating income divided by total 
assets. The partners Tobin’s q (PQ) is also used as a control and is constructed as described above. We 
similarly construct a measure of the focal firms Tobin’s q (Q) and include it as a control. We also 
controlled for the R&D intensity of both the partner firm (PRD) and the focal firm (RD), defined as the 
ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. Finally, we controlled for the size of both the partner firm 
(PLASSETS) and the focal firm (LASSETS) with the natural logarithm of each firms total assets. 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 focus on the impact of leverage on the governance form of an alliance. In 
order to test these hypotheses we employ logit models where, as before, alliances are nested within focal 
firms. The following equations were estimated:  
(3) Prob(Yij = 1)  = !! + !!!"#"$!%&!" + !!!"#$%"&'!" + !!!"#$%&!" + !!!"##$%!" +!!!"#$%&!" + !!!"#$%&%'()&!" + !!!"#$!%"%$!" + !!!"#$%&'!"+!!!"#$"%&&!" +!!"!"#!$$%&!" + !!!!"##$%!" + !!"!"#$%!" + !!"!"#$%!!" + !!"!"#!" + !!"!"#$!"!! 
(4) Prob(Yij = 1)  = !! + !!!"#"$!%&!" + !!!"#$%"&'!" + !!!"#$%&!" + !!!"##$%!" +!!!"#$%&!" + !!!"#$%&%'()&!" + !!!"#$!%"%$!" + !!!"#$%&'!"+!!!"#$"%&&!" +!!"!"#!$$%&!" + !!!!"##$%!" + !!"!"#$%!" + !!"!"#$%!!" + !!"!"#!" + !!"!"#$%!"!! 
  
 
In these models, !! is the random intercept term, which takes into account dependencies among 
alliances pertaining to the same focal firm. To test hypothesis 3, we estimate a nested specification 
(equation 3) where we include both the focal firms and its partners’ level of leverage as our main 
independent variables (LEV and PLEV, respectively). Hypothesis 3 implies that both coefficients on these 
variables will be positive, so that whenever one of the two firms is highly levered chances of a joint 
venture increase. Hypothesis 4 extends the previous argument by suggesting that equity governance will 
 also be preferred when the difference in leverage between partners is high, since under these conditions 
the lower levered firm would once again seek the protection that equity provides in terms of sustained 
commitment and protection of the value of alliance assets. To test this hypothesis we include the absolute 
difference among partners leverage (DELTA) as our main independent variable. 
 
In these specifications, we also use other controls typically employed in studies of alliance 
governance form. Five dummy variables were constructed in order to indicate whether an alliance 
included research, marketing, manufacturing, supply and licensing activities (RESEARCH, MANUFACT, 
MARKET, SUPPLY, LICENS, respectively). Three dummy variables were also employed to denote if 
partners operated in the same industry, same geographical areas, or if the geographical scope of the 
alliance was supranational (SAMEIND, SAMESTATE, SUPRANATION). We also controlled for the level 
of partner uncertainty by computing the number of alliances between the two firms during the previous 
five years (PRIORALL). To control for the effect of firm size and profitability we included the variables 
AVGASSET and AVGROA, computed as the average of partners total book assets and return on assets, 
respectively. Similarly, RASSET represents the partners relative assets, computed as the ratio of the 
smaller firms total assets over the larger firms total assets. In order to control for potential costs arising 
from capability gaps among partners, we included the variable RDGAP, computed as the absolute 
difference between firms R&D intensity. A series of dummy variables were also included to account for 
the SIC code of the alliance, with industrial codes being reclassified according to Fama and French’s 
twelve industries classification. Finally, yearly dummies capture any time effects in the choice of 
particular governance forms. 
 
Hypothesis 5 examines the relation between a firm’s alliance activity and its own level of leverage. 
In order to test this prediction, we use the entire Compustat population of firms during the period 1988-
2006 as our sample and built a panel data set where the unit of analysis is the firm-year. Firms operating 
 in financial sectors (SIC codes 6000-6999) were excluded as in other studies of capital structure. We 
employ fixed effects instrumental variables regression in order to estimate the following equation 
(5) !"#!" = !!! + !!!"!" + !!!!" + !!!"#$%&'()!" + !!!"#!" + !!!"##$%!" + !!!"#$%&'%(!" +!!!"#!" + !!!""#!$%&'!" + !!!"  
 
In this specification, the variable ALLIANCES is treated as endogenous because a firms capital 
structure decision and its alliance decisions could be jointly determined. The endogenous variable is 
instrumented in the first stage by the average number of alliances formed by firms in that industry each 
year (AVGINDALL). As the instrument is at the industry level, it should be exogenous with respect to 
firm leverage and should reflect the broader tendencies within the industry with respect to using alliances 
as a means for staying competitive. We also employ standard controls considered as determinants of 
capital structure in the literature. In addition to the variables used in the model for hypothesis 1, we 
include TANGIBLES to control for the level of assets that can be used as collateral. This variable is 
computed as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to the total book value of assets. Similarly we 
also controlled for the firm capital intensity (CAPINTENS), computed as the ratio of the firms total book 
assets over total sales. In order to account for the effect of dividend policies we included the binary 
variable DIV, which takes the value of 1 when a firm distributes dividends. Finally, to minimize the effect 
of outliers, all variables that were not binary or logged were winsorized at the 1% level.  
RESULTS 
In the interest of space, we do not report correlation matrices because our data is structured into 
several distinct datasets and hence doing so would require multiple tables. While multicollinearity was 
not a concern with our data, some interesting correlations did exist amongst our variables. Focal firm 
leverage (LEV) was positively correlated (r = 0.199) with partner leverage (PLEV), while it shows a 
negative correlation (r = -0.113) with partner quality (PQ). Moreover, both partners leverage is positively 
associated with the presence of a JV (r= 0.195 and 0.180 for LEV and PLEV, respectively). 
 Before discussing the results of our formal hypothesis tests, we present some preliminary analyses 
in Table 1 which highlight noteworthy patterns in the data that are consistent with our hypotheses. Our 
primary thesis is that high leverage makes a firm a less attractive alliance partner. An ideal test of this 
argument would involve analyzing not only the leverage levels of partners among alliances that were 
actually formed, but also among pairs of firms which did not enter into alliances, potentially because 
leverage levels or high differences in levels of leverage made the alliance unattractive. If our hypotheses 
are correct, then firms with high levels of leverage as well as potential alliance pairings with high 
differences in leverage will systematically fall out of our sample of allied firms. This introduces a form of 
truncation in our sample, since the distribution of both observed partners leverage and differences in 
leverage is truncated from above and is predominantly observed below a certain threshold. As such, for 
some of our dependent variables (for example partner leverage in equation 1), our estimates are likely to 
be understated, and thus the results of the hypotheses tests from our models are likely to be conservatively 
biased due to the truncationh. That is, if alliances among firms characterized by high levels of leverage 
were more common, then the inclusion of those observations in our sample would strengthen our 
estimates of the impact of firm leverage on partner leverage. 
To address the possibility that observed alliances are biased towards firms with lower leverage, we 
compared the absolute differences in partners leverage among observed alliance pairs with absolute 
differences from a sample of random pairs of firms drawn from Compustat. For each observed alliance in 
our sample, we constructed a random pair of firms from the same Fama-French industries in that year. 
This matched sample controls for industry and year effects and is representative of a population of 
alliances that might have potentially occurred if counterpart leverage did not matter. If leverage did not 
affect alliance formation, then there should be no significant difference in leverage between observed 
alliances and random pairings. Panel A of Table 1 reports the difference in leverage between allied pairs 
of firms and random pairings. Consistent with our arguments, in the sample of observed alliances the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
h!Hausman and Wise (1977) emphasize that OLS applied to a sample truncated from above generally 
produces estimators biased toward zero.!
 average difference in partners leverage is 15.9 percent, while the difference in the sample of random 
pairings is 22.1 percent, and a t-test confirms that the difference between the sample means is highly 
significant (p<0.001). Unreported Wilcoxon and binomial sign tests confirm that results are not driven by 
outliers. Aside from addressing self-selection bias, this preliminary evidence also tentatively corroborates 
the argument that when a firm looks for alliance partners, it tends to match with counter-parts possessing 
similar levels of leverage. Thus it appears lower levered firms systematically partner with each other, 
while high leverage firms are possibly constrained to partner with other high levered firms. 
In Panel B of Table 1 we show a similar pattern within the observed sample of alliances. We 
divided all 11,112 firms in our sample into three groups according to observed percentiles of leverage, 
and then for each group we computed the mean and median value of the partners Tobin’s q and leverage. 
For firms with the lower observed leverage (0-33 percentiles) the median level of partners Tobin’s q and 
leverage are 2.44 and 4.1 percent, respectively. Conversely, for firms with the highest observed leverage 
(66-99 percentiles) the median partners Tobin’s q drops to 1.73, while average level of partner leverage 
rises to 12.5 percent. These statistics are again consistent with our first argument that highly levered firms 
are less attractive partners and that they tend to form alliances with partners characterized by higher 
leverage as well as lower quality, thus supporting hypotheses 1-2. 
Finally, Panels C and D provide insight into the extent to which a firm’s leverage determines the 
choice of governance form in an alliance. For Panel C, we first computed the median leverage for all 
firms in the Compustat population, and then compared the number of alliances formed by firms above and 
below the median. We divided the sample according to the level of leverage of the first partner listed in 
the alliance, as it appears on SDCi. Results show that more highly leveraged firms are substantially less 
likely to form alliances, even though some research has suggested they may have a greater need to form 
alliances under some circumstances (Patzel et al. 2008). Furthermore, 24.6% of alliances involving a 
highly leveraged firm were structured as a JV, whereas only 9.2% of alliances involving a low leveraged 
firm were structured as JVs. This difference of 15.4% is also highly statistically significant (p<0.001). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i!Results are qualitatively unchanged when the second partner is considered.!
 Panel D examines how the difference in leverage across the two alliance partners relates to the 
likelihood that an alliance will be structured as a JV. We divided alliances into three groups according to 
observed percentiles of the absolute differences in leverage. JVs appear to be more likely for alliances 
characterized by relatively higher differences in leverage, increasing from 8.5% when the difference is 
relatively small to 18.1% when the difference is relatively large. The results of Panels C and D are 
consistent with our argument that when a firm has high leverage, an alliance is more likely to involve 
equity as a form of protection and safeguard for lower levered firms. The overall patterns of Table 1 are 
also consistent with our general argument that firms pay attention to the financial health of alliance 
partners, and that they structure their transactions in the market for collaboration accordingly. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Before presenting our regression results, we discuss some alternative explanations that may 
motivate patterns of leverage among allying firms. Perhaps, the underlying issue could be not whether 
leverage matters, but what factors influence leverage which in turn also impact partner attractiveness and 
alliance deals. For instance, prior research suggests leverage is negatively related to innovation as the 
latter produces mostly intangible assets with low collateral value (Simerly and Li, 2000; Vicente-Lorente, 
2001). Hence, one potential alternative explanation could simply be that our results are reflecting highly 
innovative firms partnering with other highly innovative firms, rather than matching due to leverage. 
However, high-innovation/high-leverage firms are not unusual. To examine these issues, we divided our 
sample of firms into 4 cells according to two dimensions: firms with high/low R&D and firms with 
high/low leverage. High (low) R&D firms were defined as firms that have R&D intensity greater (lower) 
than the overall Compustat population median. Similarly, we defined categories for high/low leverage 
based on Compustat median values.  After defining the 4 categories, next we randomly chose one partner 
(the first listed partner in SDC) and examined the leverage/R&D distribution of these firms. When 
considering the first listed partner in the alliance, it appears that 81 percent of our sample of alliances 
 involves high R&D firms. It is noteworthy that amongst these firms, almost 19% had above median 
leverage. Moreover, if innovation explained our results, leverage should make no difference to the 
alliances of R&D intensive firms, and the chances of an equity JV should be roughly the same 
irrespective of whether a high R&D firm has low leverage or high leverage. However, while high R&D-
low leverage firms form JVs in only 5.3 percent of the cases, this fraction increases to 12.1 percent for 
high R&D-high leverage firms. This pattern cannot be explained by R&D intensity and it is consistent 
with the idea that high leverage also introduces further hazards in the alliancej.  
Alternatively, it could also be argued that highly levered firms tend partner with lowly levered 
ones quite often as a result of resource considerations, thus violating our proposed matching among 
partners characterized by similar leverage. For instance, in biotech-pharma alliances, while the biotech 
firm’s intangible assets may prevent it from adopting higher leverage, the pharma partner can usually take 
on significant amounts of debt due to its greater tangible assets and cash flows (Gopalakrishnan et al. 
2008). Accordingly, most alliances should occur between firms possessing very different levels of 
leverage (due to their different underlying assets), while alliances between firms with similar leverage 
(high-high or low-low) should be less common. Again, our results in Panel A of Table 1 are inconsistent 
with this explanation, as observed differences in partners leverage are systematically smaller (and not 
greater) than differences computed for random pairs.  
Table 2 presents the results for our hierarchical regression models that are used to test hypotheses 
1 and 2. Note that while Table 1 was based on all 5556 observed alliances for which both partners 
leverage and Tobin’s q figures are available, the results in Tables 2 and 3 are based on a reduced sample 
of 4220 alliances due to a loss in observations because of missing data for other controls and independent 
variables. In column 1 of Table 2 the dependent variable is partner leverage (PLEV), and in column 2 the 
dependent variable is partner quality (PQ). The likelihood ratio tests confirm that in both models the 
inclusion of a random intercept for each focal firm offers significant improvement over a linear regression 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
j!Chances of a JV also increase after taking into account alliance partner level of innovativeness. For example, when 
considering only alliances involving two high R&D firms, chances of a JV increase from 4.5 percent for low 
leverage firms to 10.5 percent for high leverage firms.!
 model with fixed effects (p<0.001). Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms will tend to form alliances with 
partners possessing similar levels of leverage. Consistent with hypothesis 1, column 1 reveals that firm 
leverage (LEV) is positively related to partner leverage (p<0.001). Thus, the higher (lower) a focal firms 
leverage, the higher (lower) the levels of leverage of its counter-parts. 
The second column of Table 2 tests hypothesis 2, which argued that alliances with highly levered 
firms entail significant risks for good quality firms looking to derive valuable synergies. Thus, good 
quality firms tend to avoid high leverage partners and, all else being equal, the latter are constrained to 
partner with firms of relatively lower quality. Consistent with this argument, the coefficient on the 
variable LEV is negative and significant at the p<0.05 level, implying that higher leverage for a firm 
generally translates into lower quality alliance partners. In terms of the controls in model (1), at the focal 
firms level the variable LASSETS showed a significant negative impact on partner leverage, suggesting 
that bigger firms tend to avoid high leverage firms, possibly by virtue of their wider choice of alliance 
partners. Conversely, the positive and significant coefficient on ROA indicates that high leverage partners 
in our sample also tend to match with more profitable firms, possibly because of the latters readily 
available financial resources. Results in model (2) indicate that at the focal firm level, higher Q firms tend 
to partner with other high quality partners. Similarly, bigger firms also tend to partner with high Q firms, 
possibly in order to access the latters growth opportunities. In addition, R&D intensive firm (which may 
possess higher growth opportunities) appear to look for partners characterized by lower levels of Q in 
order to access their tangible assets in place. Similarly, after controlling for the effect of Q, more 
profitable firms also tend partner with lower quality firms, potentially for access to assets in place. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 reports results from the hierarchical logit models used to test the impact of leverage on the 
choice of governance form. Hypothesis 3 argues that alliance partners are more likely to opt for the added 
protections afforded by a JV structure when the partners are highly levered. The positive and significant 
 (p<0.001) coefficients on the variables LEV and PLEV in model 1 of Table 3 support this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 further argues that the costs of allying with a high leverage firm can be especially high for 
low leverage counter-parts, and thus alliances characterized by greater difference among partners leverage 
are more likely to take the form of a JV. In model 2 we test this prediction by including the absolute 
difference between the partners leverage (DELTA). As expected, the coefficient on this variable is 
positive and significant (p<0.001), supporting hypothesis 4. As a robustness check, we also estimated this 
model with a standard (i.e., non-hierarchical) logit model computed for the sample of 4220 alliances and 
results are qualitatively unchanged. 
In terms of the controls, most of the coefficients on our dummies accounting for the activities 
involved in the collaboration (RESEARCH, MANUFACT, SUPPLY, LICENS) and the coefficients on 
the variables SUPRANATION and SAMEIND mirror previous studies on alliance governance (Casciaro 
2003, Pisano et al. 1988, Oxley 1997, Oxley and Sampson 2004). However, the variable MARKET was 
found to have a negative impact in our study, while extant literature finds no significant effect. Similarly, 
the variable SAMESTATE had no significant effect in our analysis, while extant literature documents a 
significant negative relationship (Oxley and Sampson 2004). The coefficient on the variable PRIORALL 
is consistent with studies showing that partners with repeated ties tend to adopt more complex contractual 
forms of governance (Van de Vrande et al. 2009, Oxley and Sampson 2004, Casciaro 2003). The negative 
impact of RDGAP mirrors Kogut and Chang (1991) and suggests firms with similar levels of 
sophisticated technological capabilities adopt equity JVs, potentially to share surplus related to the 
knowledge generated. Both AVGASSET and RASSET appear to have a significant positive influence, 
while previous studies report conflicting findings (Oxley 1997). 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
Finally, Table 4 reports results for our leverage model related to hypothesis 5. In this model, the 
variable ALLIANCES is treated as endogenous and it was instrumented in the first stage by the average 
 number of alliances that firms form in an industry in a given year. Results from the second stage fixed-
effects IV regression show that after accounting for endogeneity, ALLIANCES has a significant 
(p<0.001) negative coefficient, thus corroborating hypothesis 5. Hence, it appears that firms intensively 
engaging in alliances tend to adopt lower levels of leverage, presumably to be considered more attractive 
partners and to encourage relation specific investments. The control variables produced results consistent 
with typical models of capital structure (Banerjee et al. 2008). 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 In this research we show that financial health and leverage are important considerations in 
selecting alliance partners. We argue that highly levered partners are less attractive in the context of an 
alliance for multiple reasons. First, highly leveraged partners are more prone to liquidation and 
bankruptcy risks, and thus they expose the alliance (and all investments involved) to the threat of 
unplanned termination, potentially even despite the firms best intentions. Second, we also argued that 
even when liquidation is not imminent, highly levered firms have incentives default on their implicit 
claims and reduce their efforts towards the alliance. Finally a high leverage firm facing financial distress 
may threaten to prematurely terminate an alliance in order to obtain more favorable terms. Rational firms 
will anticipate these ex-post risks ex-ante and hence will evaluate each other’s level of leverage when 
structuring transactions in the market for collaboration. 
Using a large sample of strategic alliances, we show several empirical patterns consistent with this 
theoretical framework. The first part of our analysis clearly suggests that counter-part leverage is critical 
during the process of partner selection. A double sided matching of leverage levels emerges, whereby low 
leverage firms partner with other low leverage firms and high leverage firms seem to be constrained to 
partner with other high leverage firms. Similarly, we also find that after controlling for partner quality, 
 highly levered firms tend to ally with relatively lower quality counter-parts. These findings provide 
additional insight to recent works applying the theory of marriage to the context of the market for 
collaboration (Rodhes, Kropf and Robinson 2008). This literature shows that firms tend to acquire targets 
possessing similar levels of resource quality, and that this matching occurs in order to minimize the costs 
of ex post integration while maximizing value. Our results show that in the context of alliances, partner 
attractiveness is not determined exclusively by its resource endowments but also by its financial health, as 
firms appear to take into account both aspects when scanning for potential partners.  
Our second set of results reveals an important link between firm leverage and the choice of 
governance form in alliances. Our findings show that leverage increases the probability of an alliance 
being structured as a JV. Equally interestingly, JVs appear to be more likely in the presence of greater 
difference among partners leverage. Stakeholder theories of capital structure point out that high leverage 
makes firms less attractive transacting partners without suggesting any ex post mechanisms to mitigate 
concerns related to capital structure decisions. In this respect, our study has important implications 
because it provides additional insight by theorizing the importance of governance structures as an ex post 
contractual solution to such a situation. Leveraged firms can adopt equity in order to support their 
exchanges in the face of termination risks. Thus, equity-based governance induces relation specific 
investments not only by aligning incentives through shared surplus, but also by providing an enforceable 
mechanism to mitigate the hazards posed by high leverage partners. 
This evidence also has interesting implications for research analyzing alliance governance from a 
transaction cost perspective and from a real option perspective. From a transaction cost view, our analysis 
shows that leverage is a critical source of relational uncertainty at the transaction level. Thus, in contrast 
to work that has explained governance choices by looking only at appropriability hazards (e.g. Pisano, 
1989), our analysis calls for a broader view by showing that some exchange hazards may also arise from 
firm-level characteristics such as leverage which may lead to the adoption of equity governance.  
From a real options perspective, our results also provide additional insight into the dueling options 
often inherent in the tradeoff between flexibility and commitment (Folta and OBrien, 2004). According to 
 a real options logic, firms value flexibility when faced with high uncertainty (Steensma and Corley 2001, 
Santoro and McGill 2005, Cuypers and Martin, 2007, Tong Reuer and Peng 2008). Thus, they prefer less 
hierarchical governance modes in order to avoid the opportunity costs of irreversible investments in a 
shared venture. However, our study suggests that firms may be willing to commit to a more hierarchical 
form when faced with uncertainty arising from a partners bankruptcy risks. By increasing barriers to exit 
with a JV structure, a firm mitigates the uncertainty associated with a leveraged partner as any potential 
scaling back of commitment from the relationship becomes more expensive. Although this sacrifices the 
deferment option, it also provides the low leverage firm with the option to take on the venture in the event 
of unplanned termination by the partner. As a result, although it comes with an ex ante cost, this lack of 
flexibility reduces ex post sunk costs much more effectively as compared to a non-equity agreement in the 
presence of a high leverage firm. 
Our analysis also documents the impact of alliances on firm leverage decisions. Our findings 
corroborate the idea that high leverage introduces additional risks in an alliance, and thus leverage limits a 
firms ability to transact in the market for collaboration. Accordingly, we found that alliance-intensive 
firms tend to adopt lower levels of leverage, potentially to attract better partners and induce specific 
investments. This is an important result because we believe that in a world where alliances have become 
an increasingly critical element of corporate strategic choices, more debate should be encouraged to 
understand their implications for firm characteristics, including such important decisions as capital 
structure. In this respect, our study is important not only because it provides preliminary evidence that 
alliance activity matters for leverage decisions, but it also demonstrates implications of leverage in terms 
of partner selection and contractual governance. 
Future research could extend the present work in several ways. First, it would be worth exploring 
the importance of alliance heterogeneity with respect to its impact on leverage decisions in greater depth. 
Alliances substantially differ in terms of specificity of investments involved, partner and strategic 
uncertainty, and organizational structure. As a result, it would be useful to examine the capital structure 
implications of alliances from a portfolio perspective, rather than just an individual alliance perspective as 
 we have done. Another interesting avenue for future research is to analyze whether bankruptcy risks 
influence other contractual characteristics of alliances as well. For example, firms allying with highly 
levered counterparts may prefer agreements with a predetermined duration or with a limited scope in 
order to limit the dependence on the counterpart. While lack of detailed data on our sample of alliances 
prevented us from studying these issues, future research on these topics could prove highly insightful. 
Finally, we note an important limitation of our study in that we only analyzed the negative aspects 
of partner leverage. To a certain extent, we overcome this limitation when we show that high leverage 
firms offer equity participation as a form of commitment towards the alliance in order to attract better 
partners. However, there may be also other benefits associated with highly levered partners. Extant 
literature suggests that financially constrained (i.e., highly levered) firms are more prone to form alliances 
in order to develop projects that they would not be able to pursue independently (Patzel et al. 2008, 
Lerner et al. 2003). Thus, while bringing instability, leverage could also force firms to externalize 
valuable projects that would be otherwise lost, and non-levered firms may be able to capitalize upon these 
opportunities. Future work could study the circumstances under which this may happen, such as how the 
liquidity of the market impacts alliancing behavior. Overall, our study takes an important first step at 
demonstrating a link between capital structure, financial health and alliance activity. 
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Table 1. Preliminary analysis 
Panel A: Comparison of differences in leverage 
 Mean Value     
Variable Alliances Non-alliances t(diff.) p-value   
|Δ Leverage| 0.15927 0.22190 -14.6268 <0.001   
n = 4030 
Panel B: Focal firm’s leverage and characteristics of partners 
            Mean          Median   
Percentiles of leverage Partner Leverage Partner Q Partner Leverage Partner Q   
0-33 0.110 4.36 0.041 2.44   
33-66 0.131 3.85 0.058 2.31   
66-99 0.195 2.80 0.125 1.73   
n = 11,112 
Panel C: Joint ventures activity across levels of focal firms’ leverage 
Focal Firm leverage Total alliances JVs Percent of JVs    
Below the median 4167  385 9.24    
Above the median 1389  342 24.62    
All observations 5556  727 13.08    
 
Panel D: Joint venture activity across levels of |Δ  Leverage| 
Percentiles of |Δ Leverage| Perc. of JVs      
0-33 8.53      
33-66 12.76      
66-99 18.10      
n=5556  








Partner variables   
 PLEV _ -6.443*** 
   (0.282) 
 PQ* -0.00875*** – 
  (0.000395)  
 PRD* -0.384*** 3.052*** 
  (0.0175) (0.475) 
 PLASSETS 0.0239*** -0.147*** 
  (0.000697) (0.0197) 
 PROA* -0.240*** 0.338 
  (0.00793) (0.222) 
Focal firm variables   
 LEV 0.158*** -0.684* 
  (0.0130) (0.314) 
 Q* -0.000189 0.233*** 
  (0.000457) (0.0112) 
 RD* 0.00899 -2.179*** 
  (0.0201) (0.351) 
 LASSETS -0.00547*** 0.129*** 
  (0.00107) (0.0230) 
 ROA* 0.0458*** -1.194*** 
  (0.00930) (0.229) 
 Intercept 0.0469*** 3.773*** 
  (0.00961) (0.225) 
 N 8440 8440 
 Groups 2074 2074 
 Avg. n. of obs per group 4.1 4.1 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001 
 Table 3. Hierarchical Logit Models for Governance Choice (JV) 
 
 (1) (2) 
RESEARCH -0.155 -0.224+ 
 (0.120) (0.119) 
MANUFACTUR 1.472*** 1.520*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) 
MARKET -0.283* -0.341** 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
SUPPLY -1.962*** -1.842*** 
 (0.396) (0.395) 
LICENSING -2.266*** -2.335*** 
 (0.204) (0.203) 
SUPRANATION -1.366*** -1.394*** 
 (0.227) (0.228) 
SAMESTATE 0.131 0.137 
 (0.127) (0.126) 
SAMEIND -0.235+ -0.195 
 (0.133) (0.131) 
PRIORALL 0.484*** 0.512*** 
 (0.138) (0.137) 
AVGASSET 6.64e-08 6.30e-06** 
 (2.07e-06) (1.95e-06) 
RASSET 0.747*** 0.805*** 
 (0.186) (0.185) 
RDGAP -0.920+ -1.422** 
 (0.482) (0.502) 
AVGROA 0.415 -0.0156 
 (0.493) (0.472) 
LEV 1.946***  
 (0.276)  
PLEV 1.722***  
 (0.283)  
DELTA  1.044*** 
  (0.298) 
Intercept -4.099*** -3.890*** 
 (0.423) (0.428) 
N 8440 8440 
Groups 2074 2074 
Avg. n. of obs per group 4.1 4.1 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10. * p < 0.05. ** p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001 






















Prob>F (test u_i=0) 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
